About this product Synopsis A superb introduction to the ethical aspects of war and peace, this collection of tightly integrated essays explores the reasons for waging war and for fighting with restraint as formulated in a diversity of ethical traditions, religious and secular. Beginning with the classic debate between political realism and natural law, this book seeks to expand the conversation by bringing in the voices of Judaism, Islam, Christian pacifism, and contemporary feminism. In so doing, it addresses a set of questions: How do the adherents to each viewpoint understand the ideas of war and peace?
Methodological Commensurability Those arguing for radical incommensurability — the view that the questions and answers in one tradition cannot sustain meaningful statement in the other tradition — rely on the recognition of radical difference in basic concepts and modes of inquiry.
Given such radical differences, they argue, there can be no cross-traditional reference to a common subject matter and to a truth about that subject matter that is independent of the basic conceptual vocabulary and theories and justificatory practices of a particular tradition see Rorty,and Shweder, Looking for a possible Chinese-Western instance of radical incommensurability, one might go to Daoist texts such as the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi.
Or consider the Lunyu or Analects 1: The prominent and enduring place of this theme of state as family writ large sets that tradition apart from Comparative ethics contractual traditions that have come to emphasize right order in the state as that which can be ratified by an uncoerced agreement among equals concerned to protect their private interests.
Opponents of radical incommensurability will level the charge that it presupposes a hyperdramatic contrast between traditions. For example, the Comparative ethics tradition has not lacked for skeptics on the power of discusive rationality, and some of these skeptics have nevertheless believed in a mode of veridical access to something of supreme significance — to a powerful experience within themselves or to something much larger outside themselves.
At the same time, it must be noted that the positive theme is more recessive in the Western tradition and appears mainly Comparative ethics theistic versions, as it does in Plotinus EnneadsMeister Eckhart Von unsagbaren Dingen and Hildegaard of Bingen Scivias.
Similarly, the Western tradition has certainly housed strains of thought that do view the state as more of a natural outgrowth of small human groups such as family and community. There might still be a difference between Chinese and Western traditions with respect to which strains of thought become dominant or at least prevalent, but that difference does not appear to come under the heading of radical incommensurability.
Samuel Fleischacker proposes a more moderate version of incommensurability — sometimes we can understand others just well enough to know that we don't understand them. His argument has roots in Wittgenstein's view that knowledge depends on a background of shared assumptions and standards of evidence.
Our world picture involves not only a distinctive set of beliefs about the world but also an ordering of interests that determines how we go about trying to have reliable beliefs.
This ordering differs from those dominant in other cultures. The world pictures of other cultures embody other interests, and we may not be able to prove that they are wrong, or indeed, we may be unable to fully understand why it is that they value the interests they value so highly.
Nevertheless, we understand that they do value these interests highly and think they are wrong to do so. We make such judgments despite our merely partial understanding because we tend to see a certain set of interests as the proper guide for a minimally decent or sensible human life.
Daoism and Confucianism, at least after a certain stage in the development of these schools, exemplify the way that a set of interests intertwine with beliefs about the world. To become attuned to the world is to see its goodness and to know one's place in the order of the world.
To say that Daoists exemplify this theme about seeing the goodness of the world is in a way misleading, since there is in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi a profound mistrust of our conceptual separations between opposites such as good and bad.
Confucian texts uphold the ideal of a different kind of attunement, under which the world and its order can be called good without the ambiguity that Daoist skepticism with conceptual opposition creates. Taylor thinks that modern science has severed the connection between understanding and attunement.
In Fleischacker's terms, modern science is predicated on different interests, prediction and control foremost among these interests. Taylor believes that the severance of understanding and attunement resulted in superior understanding at least of physical nature.
But as he is careful to point out, no single argument can prove global superiority. If we can take attunement as an ideal, we have failed miserably, even as our technological control of nature has increased immeasurably.
Perhaps, then, the contrast between a Chinese world picture in which attunement figures prominently and a modern scientific view predicated on the interests of prediction and control serves as an example of the sort of moderate incommensurability Fleischacker has in mind.
One question to be raised about this kind of incommensurability, however, is whether it truly involves lack of understanding between traditions.
Taylor himself draws examples of the theme of attunement from Plato and the European cultural tradition. Do we really fail to understand the appeal behind world pictures of attunement?
Taylor's complex assessment suggests no inability on our part to understand the force behind both kinds of world pictures.
Even to take the stance that attunement pictures are comforting illusions an assessment less complex than the one Taylor adopts is to suppose that one does understand the appeal behind them. Sometimes the case for incommensurability is made by pointing to the pervasive and central presence of a term in one tradition for which no equivalent term can be found in another tradition.
Such a difference may point to a degree of divergence of interests as suggested by Fleischacker. However, it is better to explore the implications of this kind of untranslatability case by case.
Erin Cline has argued for the presence of a concept of justice in the Analects despite the fact that it contains no word that is equivalent in meaning.
Cline points to concerns expressed in the text that relate to justice: If there is a contrast between the ancient Chinese tradition as represented by the Analects and modern Western traditions, it may be more a matter of the latter being especially focused on matters of distribution of goods by institutions, rather than that interest being entirely absent in the Confucian tradition.
Often, the comparative situation is a complex one in which philosophers from different traditions diverge substantially in many ways, yet converge in interesting ways in some of their central concerns.COMPARATIVE ETHICS 'COMPARATIVE ETHICS' is a 17 letter phrase starting with C and ending with S Synonyms, crossword answers and other related words for COMPARATIVE ETHICS.
We hope that the following list of synonyms for the word comparative ethics will help you to finish your crossword today. The study of comparative religious ethics is at a critical juncture, given the growing awareness of non-Christian ethical beliefs and practices and their bearing on social change.
Christine Gudorf is at the forefront of rendering comparative and competing religious beliefs meaningful for studentsReviews: 4. Yershu Kim, "Common Framework for Ethics in the 21st Century" part of the UNESCO "Universal Ethics Project" [link] see especially pages Thomas A. Lewis, “Comparative Ethics in North America: Methodological Problems and Approaches.”.
Comparative Ethics Using descriptive and/or conceptual methods, students explore major moral teachings of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and other traditions; engage in studies of social, business, health care, feminist, or sexual ethics; and address specific concerns or particular moral problems across these traditions.
Comparable worth is a strategy that attempts to correct past injustices. But implementation of comparable worth risks imposing new costs on society, and raises new questions. One of the first questions that arises in efforts to conduct comparative aesthetics is whether or not the terms ‘art’ and ‘aesthetics’ are inextricably bound to certain cultures and their presuppositions.
Since the Enlightenment, the dominant Western conception of ‘fine’ art .